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STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME XVII. JANUARY, 1942 NUMBER 1
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE COURTS*
VERN COUNTRYMAN
Twenty years after the enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,
the "trust problem" in the United States had become worse rather than
better.2 Whether this was due- to the inherent inadequacy of the Sher-
man Act, the failure of the courts to give the Act its intended effect,
the legal skill of defendants' counsel,3 or to a combination of these fac-
tors, has been a subject of much speculation. In any event, champions
of anti-trust legislation began to entertain doubts as to the efficacy of
existing law.
In 1911, the reading of the Rule of Reason into the Sherman Act4
heightened their anxiety and, furthermore, caused come considerable
consternation among those elements of the populace at whom the Act
was directed. This reaction had reached such proportions by 1912 that
the platforms of all three political parties contained planks calling for
new legislation. While the Republicans and the Progressives indorsed
the creation of a federal commission to assist in the enforcement of
legislation supplementary to the Sherman Act, the Democrats con-
tented themselves with the advocacy of a more explicit definition of the
policy and purposes of the existing law.5 Indeed, their standard bearer
was the author of a very positive criticism of any such administrative
tribunal.6
But after his election President Wilson apparently underwent a
change of opinion on the matter. In any event, he called upon Congress
not only for new legislation, but also for the creation of an Interstate
Trade Commission, although he apparently envisaged that body as little
*This article was written in connection with Professor Conrad W.
Oberdorfer's seminar on Trade Regulation, and with his assistance was.
prepared for publication.
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1934).
-ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM 3N THE UN=rm STATES (1929), 324.
"1H. Thompson, Highlights in the Evolution of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257, suggests the latter two reasons.
'Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey'v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
'G. C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CovnISSION (1924), 16, 20.
4WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM (1913), 194.
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more than an agency for investigation and publicity.7
Business men joined in the demand upon Congress for an adminis-
trative body, but they had a different purpose in mind. The Rule of
Reason had added to the uncertainty as to the meaning of the vague,
general terms of the Sherman Act, and business wanted an adminis-
trative agency which could give official advice in advance as to the
legality of proposed transactions. Such industrial notables as Mr. E. H.
Gary and Mr. George N. Perkins, among others, presented plans to
the Senate embodying proposals along that line."
But a majority of Congress had a still different idea as to what was
needed. In their view, the Commission was to have positive powers
for the enforcement of new legislation designed to supplement the exist-
ing law, in addition to the powers of investigation and publicity con-
templated by the President. Accordingly, the plans of the industrial
leaders were rejected, as apparently was Mr. William Howard Taft's
assurance that the courts were quite capable of handling the entire
matter under the Sherman Act,' and in 1914 Congress enacted the
Federal Trade Commission Act,"0 creating a five-man commission with
power to prevent "unfair methods of competition in commerce," to-
gether with additional powers of investigation and publicity." Also
enacted at the same session was the Clayton Act,'12 which gave the
Federal Trade Commission the further authority to enforce its pro-
visions against price discrimination, tying clauses, control of competi-
tors through stock acquisitions, and interlocking directorates.1 3
While the Senate debates reveal that the members of that body did
not have as clear a conception of what was included within the term
"unfair methods of competition" in the F. T. C. Act as they had of the
scope of the provisions of the Clayton Act, it is apparent that the sup-
porters of the two Acts intended each of them to go beyond what
751 CONG. REC. 1962 (1913).
8G. C. HENDERSON, Op. cit. 22.
1W. H. TAFT, THE AuiI-TRUsT ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914), pub-
lished after the 1914 legislation had passed the House, but while it was
still being considered by the Senate.
1038 STAT. 717-724 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 41-51 (1934).
"Consideration of the Commission's powers of investigation and pub-
licity under sections 6 and 9 of the F. T. C. Act, of its Trade Practice
Conferences, and of its administration of the Webb-Pomerene Export
Trade Act is beyond the scope of this article. On these topics see, gen-
erally, N. H. S. Stevens, The Federal Trade Commission's Contribution to
Industrial and Economic Analysis (1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 545; G. S.
Kittelle and E. Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of
the Federal Trade Commission (1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427; E. L.
Love, The Export Trade Act (1940), 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 608.
138 STAT. 730-740 (1914); 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27 (1934).
"Under the F. T. C. Act, the Commission's original jurisdiction is ex-
clusive. But the provisions of the Clayton Act entrusted to the Commis-
sion for enforcement are also enforceable by the Attorney-General or
by private parties.
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was covered by the Sherman Act, and not merely to stand as legis-
lative definitions of the existing law.
1 4
With the exception of the provision against interlocking directorates,
wherein "the test of illegality was frankly the test of the Sherman
Law,"' 5 this intent is clearly manifested in the terms of the Clayton Act,
since the practices therein specified are illegal if the result of their use
may be "to substantially lessen competition". In the F. T. C. Act no such
clear evidence of intent is discernible, but no discovered decision has
construed that act as limited to the scope of the Sherman Law. The
judicial position is well expressed by Mr. Justice Stone, albeit in a
dissenting opinion:"0
"That ruinous competition, or the threat of it, when the aim
is monopoly or the suppression of competition, may be the
dominant factor in a violation of the Sherman Act is no longer
fairly open to question. But, in determining the meaning of
'unfair methods of competition', it should be borne in mind
that the Trade Commission's function is to discourage certain
trade tendencies before violations of the Sherman Act have
occurred. The advised use of the phrase 'unfair methods of
competition' for the more familiar 'unfair competition' of the
common law indicates an... intent to confer on the Commis-
sion the power . . . to prevent unfair trade practices not in-
cluded in the prohibition of the Sherman Act and of the com-
mon law."
At the same time, and as a logical development from this view, it
has been frequently declared by the courts that the public policy em-
bodied in the Sherman Act should be considered as one element in
determining what constitutes an unfair method of competition.'7
Despite dire prognostications as to the unconstitutionality of the
F. T. C. Act as an unlawful delegation of legislative 8 and/or judicial 9
power, and as so indefinite as to be void for uncertainty,20 the Act has
not been invalidated in any particular upon constitutional grounds. The
lower federal courts have rejected contentions that it violates the
separation of powers doctrine,2' or the due process clause,22 or that
"For a comprehensive analysis of the Senate debates, see G. H. Mon-
tague, Unfair Methods of Competition (1915), 25 YALE L. J. 20.
'
5G. C. HmmamsoN, op. cit. 38. See discussion of this provision, p.
30, infra.
'
6Dissenting in F. T. C. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619, 628 (1927).
l?7See, e. g.: Butterick Publishing Co. v. F. T. C., 85 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936); F. T. C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
211W. H. TAFT, op. cit. 116; Senator Brandegee, 51 CoNa. Rrc. 14330 (1913).
'
0Senator Brandegee, ibid.
-1Senator Brandegee, ibid.; Senator Borah, 51 CONG. REc. 12456 (1913).
"National Harness Vfr's Ass'n v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th,
1920); T. C. Hurst & Son v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 874 (D. C. Va. 1920); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. F. T. C., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
"2Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); T.
C. Hurst & Son v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 874 ,(D. C. Va. 1920).
1942]
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its terms are so vague as to render the delegation of power unlawful.2
And when the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative delegations in
the N. R. A. for want of sufficiently definite standards, both Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes for the majority and Mr. Justice Cardozo in his con-
curring opinion pointed to the F. T. C. Act as a model form of proper
delegation..
2 4
But, while the courts have been most tolerant in proclaiming the law-
fulness of the Congressional enactments, and most discerning in detect-
ing the purpose for which they were enacted, a similar judicial attitude
has not always greeted the Commission in its attempts to carry out
that purpose. That tolerance has been absent and discernment lacking
on many a bench before which the Commission appeared will be
apparent from the pages to follow.
JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES
Jurisdiction
Under both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act,
the Commission is given jurisdiction over all forms of business in inter-
state and foreign commerce, 25 except banks and common carriers..
2
1
But in 1921, jurisdiction over the packing industry was transferred to
the Department of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards
Act.2 1
While the courts have seldom been called upon to define the Com-
mission's jurisdiction, in the few instances where that question has
been raised, the Commission has fared rather badly.
The Eighth Circuit has stated, in a case, reminiscent of the famous
Knight case,2s that Congress could give the F. T. C. no jurisdiction to
restrain the efforts of a large sugar company with factories in three
states to prevent competitors from establishing business in two of those
states, because the manufacture of sugar is not "commerce" and in-
terference with production does not directly affect commerce.2 1 While
-'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. F. T. C., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
-'Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
" ,The Clayton Act does not apply to commerce with the Philippine
Islands. Clayton Act § 1, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 (1934).
-"Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934). F. T. C.
Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C.
§ 45 (Supp. 1939). Fruit Growers' Express, Inc. v. F. T. C., 274 Fed. 205
(C. C. A. 7th, 1921), cert. granted, 257 U. S. 627 (1921); dismissed, 261 U.
S. 629 (1923).
"742 STAT. 161 (1921), 7 U. S. C. i 192 (1934). See United Corp. v. F. T.
C., 110 F. (2d) 473 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), where, after the F. T. C. had
taken jurisdiction over a meat canning corporation and had filed a
complaint, the corporation acquired stock in a packing company so as
to become a "packer" within the meaning of the Packers and Stockyards
Act, and it was held that the F. T. C. immediately lost jurisdiction.
21U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895). The Knight case was
one of the authorities relied upon by the Circuit Court.
OUtah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. F. T. C.. 22 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 8th. 1927).
Apparently, in order to avoid an unconstitutional construction of the F.
[VOL. 17
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the decision of the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp." has renounced the theory of the Knight case, later cases con-
cerning the F.T.C. have developed a new ground for limiting its juris-
diction which would also support the limitation imposed by the Eighth
Circuit.
In California Rice Industry v. F. T.C. 13 the provision in section 5
of the F.T.C. Act giving the Commission jurisdiction to prevent "unfair
methods of competition in commerce" was literally construed to re-
strict the Commission to methods which actually were "in" commerce,
and the existence of any jurisdiction over methods directly affecting
commerce was expressly negatived. Hence, it was held that, while the
F.T.C. could prevent growers and millers of rice from fixing the price
at which rice would be sold in interstate .commerce, it could not in-
terfere with practices of rice millers in California which reduced the
amount of rice milled, although those practices clearly restricted the
amount of milled rice shipped out of the state.
This construction of the statute is fortified by the decision of the Su-
preme Court in the recent case of F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros.32 where it was
held that the F.T.C. could not restrain a large candy producer, manufac-
turing in Illinois, from marketing candy in that state by the "break and
take" method, although competitors from other states had been so re-
strained. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting with Justices Black and Reed,
pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
had been held to extend to local matters affecting interstate commerce,
although the Interstate Commerce Act expressly denied the Commission
jurisdiction where the transportation was "wholly within one state",
but Mr. Justice Frankfurter replied for the majority that such a con-
struction of the F.T.C. Act "would thus give a federal agency pervasive
control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore tradi-
tionally left to local custom or local law. Such control bears no resem-
blance to the strictly confined authority growing out of railroad rate
discrimination." It is submitted that, on any broad view, the construc-
tion contended for by the F.T.C. is just as essential to its work as a
similar construction of the Interstate Commerce. Act was to the work
of the I.C.C.
In Standard Container Mfr's Ass'n Inc. v. F.T.C.3 the Bunte case
T. C. Act, the court decided that Congress had not attempted to confer
such jurisdiction upon the Commission. And see Winslow v. F. T. C., 277
Fed. 206 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921), cert. denied, 258 U. S. 618 (1922): bribery
by ship chandlers in course of sales to a foreign ship concerns purely
intrastate transactions.
•1030l U. S. 1 (1937).
3'102 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
"312 U. S. 349 (1941).
-119 F. (2d) 262 (C. C., A. 5th, 1941).
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was construed so as not to prevent the Commission from entering an
order against all industries conspiring to fix prices in intrastate and inter-
state commerce, though some of the conspirators were engaged solely
in intrastate commerce. But the only element distinguishing this case
from the Bunte case is that here the intrastate industries acted in con-
junction with industries actually doing business "in" interstate com-
merce. That this factor puts the trade practices of the intrastate opera-
tor "in" interstate commerce, and therefore beyond application of the
Bunte rule, seems questionable.
While all of the above cases were based upon construction of the
F. T. C. Act, the pertinent language of the Clayton Act is so similar
that the same construction would necessarily have to be given to its
provisions, so that the jurisdiction of the Commission clearly will
have to be confined to activities actually "in" interstate commerce,
regardless of which statute forms the basis for action.
As a matter of functional jurisdiction, the Circuit Courts hold that the
F. T. C. has jurisdiction to enter a cease and desist order under the
F. T. C. Act although the objectionable practice has ceased before the
Commission issues its complaint,34 or before its order is entered, 3 and
the Supreme Court has given a similar construction to the Clayton Act
in a case where the practice was discontinued after the F. T. C. order
had been entered and while an appeal therefrom was pending."6 But
the Third Circuit has held that where, before the complaint is filed, the
offender discontinues the practice and offers to stipulate that he will not
resume it, the F. T. C. cannot enter a cease and desist order."'
Procedure
Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act provides that when the Commission
"shall have reason to believe that any ...person ...has been or is
"
4Educator's Ass'n, Inc. v. F. T. C., 108 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939);
National Silver Co. v. F. T. C., 88 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Fairy-
foot Products Corp. v. F. T. C., 80 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); Arkansas
Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927),
cert. denied, 275 U. S. 533 (1927); Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 13
F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. F. T. C., 285
Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
'IF. T. C. v. McLean & Son, 84 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); F. T.
C. v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); Lighthouse Rug
Co. v. F. T. C., 35 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Juvenile Shoe Co., Inc.
v. F. T. C., 289 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 705
(1923). Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act authorizes the Commission to act
whenever it has reason to believe that any person "has been or is using
any unfair method of competition, or unfair or deceptive act or practice."
38 STAT. 719 (1914) as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp.
1939). (Italics supplied.)30F. T. C. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U. S. 257 (1938). Section
11 of the Clayton Act authorizes the Commission to act whenever it has
reason to believe that any person "is violating or has violated any of
the provisions" which the F. T. C. is authorized to enforce. 38 STAT. 734
(1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934). (Italics supplied.)37John C. Winston Co. v. F. T. C., 3 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
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using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or
practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that a
proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public,
it shall issue and serve upon such person ...a complaint stating its
charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a
day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service
of said complaint. The person.., so complained of shall have the right
to appear... and show cause why an order should not be entered by
the Commission requiring such person . .. to cease and desist from
the violation of the law so charged in said complaint."38 Section 11 of
the Clayton Act 9 contains a similar provision, except that there is no
requirement that it appear to the Commission that a proceeding would
be to the interest of the public.
Upon this statutory foundation, and with its authority under section
6 (9) of the F. T. C. Act40 to "make rules and regulations for the pur-
pose of carrying out the provisions" of the F. T. C. Act,41 the Commis-
sion has erected its procedural system.
Preliminary Procedure. The information upon which the Comnmission
acquires "reason to believe" that the law has been or is being violated
comes either from initial investigation by the Commission or from
charges made by consumers or competitors, followed up by investiga-
tion. With one class of cases excepted, most of the original information
comes from outside parties. The Rules of Practice provide for an
"application for complaint" and require that such application be written
and signed, and contain a "short and simple statement of the facts con-
stituting the alleged violation of law and the name and address of the
applicant and the party complained of."142 In practice, however, the
rule often is not observed and the Commission has said that a letter
setting forth the facts and accompanied by all the evidence in the
possession of the complaining party is sufficient. Indeed, it is reported
that the Commission also institutes investigations upon the basis of
anonymous letters, if they contain specific allegations, rather than
general denunciations. 43
Each charge of apparent merit is investigated by a member of the
3838 STAT. 719, as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp.
1940).
3138 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934).
4038 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 46 (1934).
&"Although the rules are without express statutory authority, insofar as
they apply to proceedings under the Clayton Act, such authority undoubt-
edly would be implied if its exercise were contested.
'
2F. T. C. Rules of Practice (1941), Rule 7, 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv.
15013. The F. T. C. is most careful in concealing the identity of the
person supplying the information upon which" the complaint is based.
G. C. HENDEasoN, op. cit. 64.
"Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, mono-
graph No. 6, The Federal Trade Commission (1940), 119.
1942]
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Commission's staff,44 and his report, together with the recommendation
of the Chief Examiner, either for dismissal, settlement by stipulation,
or issuance of complaint, is submitted to the Commission for its deter-
mination of the action to be taken.
Information of false advertising is secured in another manner. To
handle these cases, the Commission has created a Radio and Periodical
Division with the sole duty of constantly investigating newspaper, mag-
azine and radio advertising and reporting all unlawful activity, together
with a recommendation of the action to be taken thereon, to the
Commission.
The practice of giving each case the personal consideration of the
Commissioners has been criticized as an unnecessary burden on
Commissioners already overworked,45 but a learned student of the
Commission declares that this function could not be delegated-that it
is a majority of the five Commissioners, and not some subordinate, who
must have the "reason to believe" that the law has been or is being
violated. 6 While so strict a construction of the statutory language seems
undesirable, it is, perhaps, not unwarranted in view of the treatment
given other provisions of the statute by the courts. In any event, this
seems to be the construction adopted by the Commission.
Stipulations. Early in 1925 the Commission adopted a method of
settling some cases by stipulation, rather than by prosecution. The
stipulation used in this situation contains an admission of material facts,
a promise to cease and desist, and an agreement that if thereafter the
Commission has reason to believe that the stipulator is violating his
promise to cease and desist and begins prosecution the admission may
be used against him.4 7 Such stipulations differ from consent decrees in
that violation thereof is not a basis for sanctions, but must be followed
up by prosecution.
Most violators are given an opportunity to avail themselves of this
stipulation procedure and more cases are now settled by stipulation
than by prosecution.' However, the violator is not allowed to settle
by stipulation where the practices used involve fraud; false advertising
of dangerous foods, drugs, devices or cosmetics; suppression or restraint
of competition through conspiracy or monopolistic practices; or viola-
tions of the Clayton Act.49
"During the investigation, the party investigated is given ample op-
portunity to present facts in his defense. Robert E. Freer, Federal Trade
Commission Procedure and Practice (1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 316, 318.45Attorney-General's Committee, op. cit. 19.
46G. C. HENDERSON, op. cit. 50.
"TFor a case where the admissions were so used, see Rock v. F. T. C..
117 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).48During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938, 564 cases were settled by
stipulation and 310 complaints were issued. F. T. C., ANNUAL REPORT
(1938), 94.
41F. T. C., Statement of Policy (1941), 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv. 15021.
[VOL. 17
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Complaints. If the case is not dismissed or settled by stipulation, the
Commission issues and serves5" its complaint. Both the Clayton Act'
and the F. T. C. Act 52 require that the complaint contain a statement of
the Commission's charges and include a notice of hearing at a day
and place at least thirty days after the service of the complaint. The
framing of the charges has been a matter of paramount importance
since the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gratz case5" that unless
the complaint sets forth sufficient facts to show on its face a violation
of the law, an order based thereon will be set aside, regardless of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the order.
With respect to prosecutions under the Clayton Act, the issuance of
complaints is solely in the discretion of the F. T. C. But the F. T. C.
Act recites that "if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it ... would be to the interest of the public" it shall issue and serve
a complaint,54 and out of this language the courts have framed a juris-
dictional requirement-if there is no public interest in the case (and
this question is for the court in the last instance), the Commission is
without authority to issue the complaint.5 5 This construction of the
statute seems wholly unwarranted-it could with as much logic be
held that the courts should review the question of the Commission's
reason to believe that the law has been or is being violated. The statu-
tory language seems clearly designed as a guide to the Commission in
the exercise of its discretion and hothing more. Moreover, as is indicated
by a careful student of the statute,5 6 there seems to be no reason to dis-
regard the words, "if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceed-
"°Service of the complaint, orders and other processes of the Commis-
* sion may be by personal service, by leaving a copy at. the principal office
or place of business, or by registered mail. Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT.
734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934); F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as
amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939). The Rules
provide for service by registered mail unless one of the other methods
is specifically ordered by the Commission. F. T. C. Rules of Practice
(1941), Rule 3, 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv. 15011.
r'Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934).
r2F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1940).
53F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920). See also, Century Metalcraft
Corp. v. F. T. C., 112 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Heuser v. F. T. C.,
4 F (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
14F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939).
5F. T. C. v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929); Flynn & Emrich Co. v. F. T.
C., 52 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Standard Oil Co. v. F. T. C., 282
Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. F. T. C., 264 Fed.
509 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); F. T. C. v. Gratz, 258 Fed. 314 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
"G. C. HENDERsON, op. cit. 53. See also J. L. Mechem, Procedure and
Practice Before the Federal Trade Commission (1922), 21 MICH. L. REv.
125, 139: "It would seem that the determination of public interest is an
administrative function only, not open to judicial review, except, per-
haps, where such determination is so arbitrary as to be beyond the
powers of the Commission and to work a denial of due process."
1942]
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ing would be to the interest of the public." Nonetheless, the require-
ment is now firmly established in the case law governing the Commis-
sion, and the element of public interest must be alleged in the complaint
and supported by the evidence in all prosecutions under the F. T. C.
Act.1
7
Answer. Although the statutes make no provision for any form of
pleading by the respondent, the Rules of the Commission require the
filing of an answer within 20 days of the service of the complaint,
which answer shall contain a concise statement of facts constituting the
ground of defense and shall specifically admit or deny or explain each
fact alleged in the complaint, unless respondent is without knowledge,
in which case he shall so state. 8 Failure to answer and failure to appear
are deemed to authorize the Commission, without further notice, to
proceed upon the charges.59 But there is no taking of default judgment.
The hearing is held and evidence is taken in support of the complaint
just as if respondent had appeared.6" Moreover, even though the re-
spondent fails to file an answer, he may appear at the hearing and con-
trovert the allegations of the complaint, since the statutes provide that
the person complained of shall have the right to appear and show cause
why an order should not be issued against him."1
Hearing. Hearings are had before trial examiners, who make their
report to the Commission, with the actual decision, based on this report,
coming from the Commission. The manner of conducting the hearings
has seldom been attacked in the courts. However, it has been decided
that the respondent is not denied a fair hearing merely because the
examiner requires him to put in his evidence before the government's
case is closed.6 2 Nor is he entitled to examine confidential reports to
the Commission, used by the Commission's witness to refresh his recol-
5 That no such showing need be made under Clayton Act, see Webb-
Crawford Co. v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied,
310 U. S. 638 (1940).
'IF. T. C. Rules of Practice (1941), Rule 9, 2 C. C. 11 Tr. Reg. Serv.
15013. This rule also provides for an answer which admits the allegations
of facts and which is treated as a demurrer, except that if the Commission
rules against respondent he cannot plead further. Disputes as to fact
can also be resolved by stipulation.
69Ibid.
0 Robert E. Freer, op. cit. 323.
"Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934); F. T.
C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C.
§ 45 (Supp. 1939).
"-California Lumbermen's Council v. F. T. C., 115 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A.
9th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 709 (1941). See the previous opinion of
the Circuit Court in this case, California Lumbermen's Council v. F. T. C.,
103 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), holding that a motion to strike the
transcript of the F. T. C. record is not the proper manner of raising the
fairness of the hearing, and suggesting, most indirectly, that the proper
method would be a petition to set aside the order on appeal, which method
was used in the second case.
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lection, but not considered by the Commission in reaching its decision."
Although the F. T. C. Act, in authorizing the Commission to issue
subpoenas,8 4 makes no provision for the use of this power on behalf of
the respondent, the Rules of Practice do make this power available to
the respondent on written application. 5
The statute66 contains an immunity provision which deprives any
witness of his right to refuse to testify or produce other evidence on the
grounds of self-incrimination. 7 By the terms of the statute, the im-
munity is extended only as to evidence given in response to a subpoena.68
It seems now to be settled that the privilege against self-incrimination
must be claimed in order to get the protection of the immunity.6 9
Neither the F. T. C. Act nor the Clayton Act mentions the kind
of evidence which shall be received and, except for a provision relating
to segregation of relevant from irrelevant matter in documents offered
in evidence,7 0 the Rules of Practice make no such provision either.
However, the trial examiners' rulings on admissibility of evidence
seldom have been contested in court, and never successfully. The rule
established by the few decided cases is that the Commission is not
restricted to the use of legally competent evidence, but can use evidence
"of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the conduct of
their daily and more important affairs."' It has been stated by a mem-
ber of the Commission that, as a matter of practice, the examiners
1Alberty v. F. T. C., 118 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. denied,
62 Sup. Ct. 62 (1941).
41F. T. C. Act. § 9, 15 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 49 (1934).
'SF. T. C. Rules of Practice (1941), Rule 15, 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv.
15015. But mandamus will not lie from a District Court to compel the
F. T. C. to issue subpoenas. McFadden Publications v. F. T. C., 37 F. (2d)
822 (App. D. C. 1930). Respondent's remedy is limited to raising objec-
tions in the Circuit Court on appeal, or upon petition by the F. T. C. to
enforce its order. Review by the Circuit Court is the exclusive remedy,
and it Is limited to final orders. Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 280
Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
'OF. T. C. Act § 9, 38 STAT. 722 (1916), 15 U. S. C. § 49 (1934).
"?See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), sustaining a similar statute
applicable to proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
"sSherwin v. U. S., 268 U. S. 369 (1925); Cannon v. U. S., 19 F. (2d) 823
(C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Pandolfo v. Biddle, 8 F. (2d) 142 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925).
09It was held in U. S. v. Pardue, 294 Fed. 543 (S. D. Texas, 1923), that
the privilege need not be claimed, but the contrary rule was established
in Sherwin v. U. S., 297 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924), aif'd, 268 U. S. 369
(1925).
70F. T. C. Rules of Practice (1941), Rule 17, 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv.
15015.
7lJohn H. Bene & Sons v. F. T. C., 299 Fed. 468, 471 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
See, to the same effect, F. T. C. v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1930); Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 18 F. (2d)
866 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Hills Bros. v. F. T. C., 9 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926).- In support of such a rule, see Albert E. Stephan, The Extent to
Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by Rules of Evidence (1938),
24 A. B. A. J. 630; A. T. Vanderbilt, The Technique of Proof Before
Administrative Bodies (1939), 24 IowA L. Rsv. 464.
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rarely permit any departure from the rules of evidence in federal equity
causes.'
2
No oral argument is heard by, and no briefs are submitted to the trial
examiner at the close of the taking of evidence, though the examiner
is empowered to receive from counsel on each side a written statement
of their contentions as to the facts proved. 73 After the examiner's report
upon the evidence is submitted to the Commission, briefs may be filed
with the Commission,' 4 and oral argument before the Commission may
be allowed. 7' The briefs, argument and examiner's report are then
considered by one (or sometimes all) of the Commissioners and, after
discussion of his recommendations the disposition to be made of the
case is finally determined by the entire Commission.
Remedies
Orders of the Commission. The statutes provide that if the Com-
mission be of the opinion that any of the provisions of the law have
been violated, it shall serve on the violator an order to cease and desist
from such violations."6 Section 11 of the Clayton Act7 7 also authorizes
an order requiring the violator to divest itself of stock held in violation
of the section 7, or to rid itself of directors chosen contrary to the pro-
visions of section 8.
Under these provisions it has been judicially determined that the
Commission can order the violator so to divest itself of stock held in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act as not to use the control re-
sulting therefrom to secure the assets of the corporation whose stock is
held, but that it cannot order the divestment of assets so secured before
the complaint is filed.," Similarly, it was held that the Commission had
no authority under the F. T. C. Act to order a motion picture film manu-
facturer to dispose of certain film development laboratories which it
had acquired in order, by threat of competition, to coerce other develop-
ment companies into buying all film from it (this practice having been
found to violate section 5.)79
Immediately after the first of these cases had established the princi-
ple of the race of diligence, the F. T. C. adopted the practice of issuing
complaints without affording respondents the chance to be heard in
7-Robert E. Freer, op. cit. 327.
7'F. T. C. Rules of Practice (1940), Rule,22, 2 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv.
15017.
"Ibid. Rule 23.
7'Ibid. Rule 24.
-IF. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939); Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914). 15 U.
S. C. § 21 (1934).
7"Ibid.
8Western Meat Co. v. F. T. C., 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
'
9F. T. C. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927). See also J. W.
Kobi v. F. T. C., 23 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
[VOL. 17
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
advance which was previously given in all cases.80
But the violators were given another opportunity to evade the Com-
mission's order by a subsequent decision holding that the Commission
had no authority to order a divestiture of assets acquired by use of
stock control (secured in violation of the Clayton Act) to effect a merger
of competing companies after the complaint was filed."1 . Since-the sta-
tute," and probably the Constitution,8 3 requires that the respondent be
given notice of the proceedings against him before an order can issue,
all odds are in favor of the violator in the race of diligence in this
situation.
Another difficulty, inherent in the nature of the activities controlled
by the Commission, is that of framing the language of the order. An
order to cease use of an advertisement, the precise text of which is set
forth,"4 is too easily evaded by a slight alteration of the wording of the
advertisement, whereas an order which attempts to anticipate every
possible evasion may disintegrate into "little more than an injunction
to be honest."8' 5 Between the Scylla of too great particularity, and the
Charybdis of over-generality, then, the Commission must steer its
course in drafting orders.
Judicial Review. The Clayton Act.86 and originally the F. T. C. Act,8"
provided that the Commission might apply to the Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the enforcement of its orders, that the respondent might
appeal thereto from the orders, and that the Courts should have juris-
diction to affirm, set aside or modify the order, which jurisdiction should
be exclusive. 8 In 1938 the provisions of the F. T. C. Act were amended
80-1. A. McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON T FEDERAL ANn-TRUST LAWS (1933), 300,
n. 94.
8
"Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. F. T. C., 291-U. S. 587 (1934).
Nor can the F. T. C. prevent the violator from acquiring the assets of a
competitor by suing on a bona fide debt and levying upon the property.
Western Meat Co. v. F. T. C., 33 F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); Aluminum
Co. of America v. F. T. C., 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert. denied,
261 U. S. 616 (1923).
"Clayton Act. § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 21 (1934).
"'See Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 322.
8
'See, for instance, the order in In re Plunkett Chemical Co., 3 F. T. C.
53 (1920).
85G. C' HENDERSON, op. cit. 77. See, for example, the orders in In re
Boston Piano & Music Co., 3 F. T. C. 168 (1920) and In re Raymond Bros.-
Clark Co., 3 F. T. C. 295 (1921). With reference to the latter order, the
Circuit Court observed, while vacating it on other grounds, "the order
set forth is as broad as the business world, and in any event would have
to be modified if it were to be sustained in any particular." Raymond
Bros.-Clark Co. v. F. T. C., 280 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).8 Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934).87F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914).
8sCertiorari does not lie in C. C. A. to contest jurisdiction of the F. T. C.
because of alleged unconstitutionality of the F. T. C. Act. The statute
makes appeal an exclusive remedy. Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C.,
280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). The statutes also provide for review of
the C. C. A. decision by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
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by the Wheeler-Lea Act"9 providing, generally, that orders of the
Commission become final if no appeal is filed within sixty days of service
of the order, and that such final order may be enforced by penalties for
violation, collected in a civil action brought in the District Court by the
Department of Justice.90
This amendment leaves the respondent with his remedy of appeal to
the Circuit Court, but relieves the Commission of the possible necessity
of proving a second and subsequent violation of the law before it can
get a court order enforcing its order, and of proving a third violation in
contempt proceedings to compel obedience to the court's order. Of
course, this is still the method for enforcement of orders under the
Clayton Act, since the Wheeler-Lea Act did not modify the Clayton Act.
On appeal, or upon application by the Commission for enforcement
of its order (now required only under the Clayton Act), the Commission
is required to send up a transcript of the entire record of the proceeding,
including all testimony taken and the report and order of the Com-
mission.9
The chief ground for appeal or for defense on the Commission's appli-
cation for enforcement, is that the Commission has erred in finding that
respondent's activities constituted a violation of law. Under established
administrative law formulae, this involves a question of law, which is
ultimately to be determined by the courts. 2 Consequently, the Com-
mission's definitions of unfair methods of competition, or of violations
of the Clayton Act, as including the practices of the respondent, are
-52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939). For enforcement of
an order under this statute, see U. S. v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119 (S. D. Cal.
1941).
"
0That this amendment is not unconstitutional, as an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative or judicial powers to the F. T. C., or as violative of
the equal protection or due process clauses, 'tee Ostler Candy Co. v. F.
T. C.. 106 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939), cert. denied. 309 U. S. 675
(1940): National Candy Co. v. F. T. C., 104 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
cert. denied, 308 U. S. 610 (1939). Note (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 626 makes
a valiant attempt to pick out some situations in which the final order
might be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds, but suc-
ceeds in rebutting most, if not all, of its own arguments.
"IF. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15
U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939): F. T. C. v. Inecto, Inc., 70 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A.
2d. 1934). Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1934).
It has twice been held that the examiner's report need not be made a
part of the record. Algoma Lbr. Co. v. F. T. C., 56 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932). afi'd, 291 U. S. 67 (1934); Raladam Co. v. F. T. C., 42 F. (2d) 430
(C. C. A. 6th, 1930), aff'd, 283 U. S. 643 (1931). But see Kidder Oil Co. v.
F. T. C.. 117 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), holding that the statute
either requires that the examiner's report be made a part of the record
or leaves it to the discretion of the C. C. A. to consider the report. The
Rules of Practice had expressly provided that the examiner's report should
not be included in the record, but after this case that provision was
deleted by 1941 amendment. F. T. C. Rules of Practice (1941), Rule 20, 2
C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv. 15016.
'-This doctrine was first established, with relation to F. T. C. proceed-
ings, in F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
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reviewed by the courts, and the difference between judicial and Com-
mission definitions has led to the setting aside of more of the Commis-
sion's orders than has any other ground of appeal."*
The statutes provide that the findings of the Commission as to' the
facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive,94 but this leaves
to the determination of the courts the all-important question as to
whether or not the findings are supported by testimony. The Supreme
Court evidenced an unusual generosity toward the fact-finding process
of the Commission in F. T. C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n.9 5
But some of the Circuit Courts were not so liberally inclined,9 6 and it
was not until the Supreme Court had administered a verbal spanking to
the Ninth Circuit in F. T. C. v. Algoma Lbr. Co.,97 followed by another
liberal holding in favor of the Commission in F. T. C. v. Keppel &
Bros.,98 that the Circuit Courts finally came around to a more generous
approach.09
On the whole, it may be said that the courts are now giving the find-
ings of the Commission adequate treatment,10 0 overturning them only
where the evidence does seem not to support them.' 0' However, the
"Recall that the courts have also taken over the review of the question
of public interest in proceedings under the F. T. C. Act on the theory that
this involved a "matter of law", p. 9, supra.
"0F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939); Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U.
S. C. § 21 (1934).
"5273 U. S. 52, 61 (1927): "The weight to be given to the facts and
circumstances admitted, as well as the inference reasonably to be drawn
from them is for the Commission."
"See, e. g., Algoma Lbr. Co. v. F. T. C., 64 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933); F. T. C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1932); V. Vivaudou v. F. T. C., 54 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. F. T. C., 275 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
"7291 U. S. 67 (1934).
"291 U. S. 304 (1934). See also F. T. C. v. Standard Education Society,
302 U. S. 112 (1937).
"'See Fioret Sales Co., Inc. v. F. T. C., 100 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938) and L. & C. Mayers Co. v. F. T. C., 97 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
wherein Judge Manton reverses the position he had taken in the Vivaudou
and Paramount Famous-Lasky cases. See also F. T. C. v. Inecto, Inc., 70
F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) and F. T. C. v. A. McLean & Son, 84 F.(2d), 910 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 590 (1936), the court
in the latter case finding a presumption in support of the Commission's
findings. The Third Circuit came to the startling conclusion that the
Algoma case had established that "the fact findings of the Commission
are not to be regarded as merely persuasive." F. T. C. v. Artloom Corp.,
69 F. (2d) 36, 37 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
"1'Accord: William G. Daniels, Judicial Review of the Fact Findings
of the Federal Trade Commission (1939), 14 WASH. L. REV. 37; J. F. Davison,
The Place of the Federal Trade Commission in Administrative Law (1940),
8 GEO. WAsH. L. Rv. 280. But see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. F. T. C.,
101 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), introducing into F. T. C. jurisprudence
the time-honored, but rather questionable concept of mixed questions of
fact and law.
"'ISee Belmont Laboratories v. F. T. C., 103 F. (2d) 538, 542 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939): "We may say that the examination of the witnesses gives the
impression that the Federal Trade Commission's legal staff did not equip
1942]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court in an earlier decision, written by Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds, expressed one very questionable proposition which still lingers
in F. T. C. jurisprudence. In F. T. C. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,102
it was held that if it appeared to the Court that material facts were not
reported by the Commission and if "in the interest of justice the con-
troversy should be decided without further delay," the court could
examine the record and make additional findings itself, instead of send-
ing the case back to the Commission. Mr. Chief Justice Taft wrote a
separate opinion, joined in by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in which he ques-
tioned the propriety of the Court's usurping the fact-finding functions
of the Commission. The rule of this case has been accepted in subse-
quent decisions in the lower courts without question, 10 3 but the present
judicial tendency gives reason to hope that the "additional facts" doc-
trine will be repudiated when next the point is raised in the Supreme
Court.
A few cases have involved an attack on the Commission's orders on
the ground of unfairness at the hearing, but, while the courts have
accepted this factor as a proper ground for setting aside the order,
they have not yet found instances of actual unfairness.1
0 4
The Circuits have disagreed as to the procedure which must be
taken by the F. T. C. to get its order enforced by the courts. The
Seventh Circuit holds that the Commission must prove violation of the
ordex before the court will take jurisdiction to affirm it, and must
prove a new violation of the affirmed order before the violator can be
found in contempt. 10 5 On the other hand, the Second, Fourth and Ninth
Circuits will determine the validity of the order on application, but will
not decree enforcement until violation is proved, and it is only violation
of a decree of enforcement which will subject the violator to contempt
proceedings. 0 6 As to prosecutions under the F.T.C. Act, this difficulty is
itself with even the elementary medical books we borrowed from a local
physician." And see Kidder Oil Co. v. F. T. C., 117 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941), holding that the fact that the trial examiner's report differs
from the Commission's findings "materially detracts from the Commis-
sion's claim that its findings are substantially supported."
102260 U. S. 568 (1923).
1°'James S. Kirk & Co. v. F. T. C., 59 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932);
F. T. C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932); V. Vivaudou v. F. T. C., 54 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
1°*Alberty v. F. T. C., 118 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. denied,
62 Sup. Ct. 62 (1941) (Examiner refused to allow respondent to inspect
confidential report to Commission, used by Commission's witness to re-
fresh his recollection, but not considered by F. T. C. in making its deci-
sion.); California Lumbermen's Council v. F. T. C., 115 F. (2d) 178 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1940) (Respondent was required to put in his evidence before
F. T. C.'s case was closed.).
115F. T. C. v. Fairyfoot Products Co., 94 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938);
F. T. C. v. Standard Education Society, 14 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
1°6F. T. C. v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277
U. S. 598 (1928); F. T. C. v. Baltimore Paint & Color Works, 41 F. (2d)
474 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Electro Thermal Co. v. F. T. C., 91 F. (2d) 477
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 748 (1938).
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obviated by the Wheeler-Lea Act, which, in addition to dispensing with
the old method of enforcement of orders under the F. T. C. Act, gives
the Circuit Courts the power, on appeal from such orders, not only to
affirm, modify, or set aside the Commission's order as under the original
F. T. C. Act and the Clayton Act, but also to enforce "the same to the
extent that the order is affirmed," and to "issue such writs as are
ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary ...to prevent injury to
the public or to competitors' pendente lite," and provides that, to the
extent the order is affirmed, the court shall issue its own order com-
manding obedience to the terms of the Commission's order.10 7
The Circuit Courts have made extensive use of their power to modify
the Commission's orders. Orders directing respondent to cease an unfair
method of competition consisting in the use of misleading trade names
have been modified in cases involving long-established names, either
to permit continued use of the names with qualifying words which
are designed to avoid the previously existing element of deception, 08
or to allow the respondent an extension of time within which to use
the old name in conjunction with a new one, so that the public will have
an opportunity to identify the product with the new name before the
old one is abandoned.10 9
Two distinct lines of authority have grown up in the cases forbidding
lottery sales of candy. One line holds that an order forbidding a man-
ufacturer to sell candy in packages that "may" be sold by gaming
methods is too broad as imposing upon the manufacturer a respon-
sibility for unfair methods of retailers, and modifies the order by re-
placing the objectionable word with the phrase "are designed to."" 0
The other line of cases holds that the order is not too broad and could
20752 STAT. 111 (1938), 45 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939).
08Educator's Ass'n, Inc. v. F. T. C., 108 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938);
Fioret Sales Co., Inc. v. F. T. C., 100 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
F. T. C. v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935);
F. T. C. v. Maisel Trading Post, 77 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
Royal Milling Co. v. F. T. C., 58 F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); F. T.' C.
v. Morrissey, 47 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); F. T. C. v. Good-Grape
Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); F.-T. C. v. Cassoff, 38 F. (2d)
790 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); N. Fluegelman & Co. v. F. T. C., 37 F. (2d) 59(C. C. A. 2d, 1930). Such modification will not be made where the only
effect of possible additional legends would be to contradict, rather than to
qualify a deceptive trade name. H. N. Heusner & Son v. F. T. C., 106 F.(2d) 596 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); El Moro Cigar Co. v. F. T. C., 107 F. (2d)
429 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); F. T. C. v. Army & Navy Trading Co., 88 F. (2d)
776 (App. D. C., 1937).
200H. N. Heusner & Son v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
Masland Duraleather Co. v. F. T. C., 34 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929);
See Note (1940) 38 MIcH. L. REV. 752, favoring such modification.
"z0Sweets Co. of America v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
(See dissent in this case, suggesting that manufacturer be required to label
the packages, "Not to be sold by chance."); Helen Ardelle, Inc. v. F. T. C.,
101 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); F. T. C. v. Charles N. Miller Co., 97
F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938); F. T. C. v. McLean & Son. 84 F. (2d) 910
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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not be construed to impose such responsibility on the manufacturer."'
F. T. C. orders have also been modified to conform to the allegations
of the complaint and the findings of the Commission ,112 to eliminate
provisions based on findings not supported by evidence,"' and to
eliminate provisions as to matters over which the Commission has no
jurisdiction."'
It might well have been decided that the power of the Circuit Courts
to modify orders of the Commission was confined to the correction of
technical defects of the sort involved in the cases last mentioned and
should not include the power to vary the nature or terms of the order
in situations where the courts disagreed with the Commission's ideas of
enforcement policy and technique, but the manner in which the courts
have construed and exercised their power in this respect seems never
to have been challenged by the Commission, and the inertia of the de-
cided cases precludes any such contention now.
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the F. T. C. is authorized
to prevent the use of "unfair methods of competition in commerce."'1
The Clayton Act also authorizes the Commission to prevent the spe-
cific practices of price discrimination, 1 6 use of tying clauses," 17 acqui-
sition of stock of competitor corporations," 8 and establishment of inter-
locking directorates among competitors," 9 as therein defined. In some
instances a trade practice may violate the provisions of both acts. In
a few instances, a violation of the Clayton Act will not also constitute
a violation of the F. T. C. Act. In many instances, a violation of the
F. T. C. Act will not also constitute a violation of the Clayton Act.
Price Discrimination
The Clayton Act, as originally passed, made it unlawful to discrim-
inate in price between purchasers buying commodities in interstate or
foreign commerce "where the effect of such discrimination may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." Specific exemptions were provided for differentials
"'Ostler Candy Co. v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U. S. 675 (1940); National Candy Co. v. F. T. C., 104 F.
(2d) 999 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 610 (1939).
112Century Metalcraft Corp. v. F. T. C., 112 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th.
1940).
"'Belmont Laboratories v. F. T. C., 103 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
"'Ibid.
"I'F. T. C. Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1934). The addition
of the phrase "and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce"
by the Wheeler-Lea Act will be discussed under the title, Protection of
the Consumer, to appear in the next issue.
'Clayton Act § 2, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1939).
1Clayton Act § 3, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1934).
"'Clayton Act § 7, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1934).
19Clayton Act § 8, 38 STAT. 732 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 19 (1934).
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made on account of differences in the "grade, quality or quantity of
the commodity sold," or to allow for differences in selling or trans-
portation cost, or in good faith to meet competition.12
The Commission's prosecutions under this statute got off to a bad
start in the courts. In Mennen Co. v. F. T. C.121 the Second Circuit
held that the F. T. C. could not prevent a manufacturer from classify-
ing his customers as "wholesalers" and "retailers," according to the
nature of the resale, rather than the quantity purchased, as a basis
for giving a larger trade discount to the former than to the latter. This
holding was based on the court's construction of the statute as forbid-
ding price discrimination only where there was tendency to monopoly or
to the lessening of competition between the manufacturer and his com-
petitors, and not between customers of the manufacturer. This restrictive
interpretation was induced, said the court, by the fact that Congress
had substituted the phrase it construed for the words in the original
bill, "with the purpose or intent thereby to destroy or wrongfully injure
the business of a competitor of either such purchaser or seller." Ap-
parently the court was unaware of the fact that when the bill was
finally reported out of conference to the House, it was explained by
Congressman Webb that the purpose of the substitution was "to give
the section more elasticity and breadth."' 22 The court also held that
the methods here used by the manufacturer were not unfair methods of
competition under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act.
A year later the same court again reversed the Commission on its
decision that a similar method of classifying customers for purposes
of allowing quantity discounts violated Section 2 of the Clayton Act
and Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act, re-affirming its construction of the
Clayton Act in the Mennen case. 22 These decisions clearly limited
the application of Section 2 to the practice of local price-cutting em-
ployed by such large industries as the Standard Oil Company, and since
this practice had become much less prevalent by that time anyway
because of its destructive effect upon consumer good-will, the effect
of the decisions -was to renddr the statute practically nugatory. 12 4
A few years later, however,' in a suit between private litigants, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the construction given Section 2 in
the above cases and held that the statute was violated where the effect
of a price discrimination was substantially to lessen competition between
1-0 Clayton Act § 2, 38 STAT. 730 (1914). This section also contained a
proviso specifically allowing persons to select their own customers "in
bona fide transactions .. .not in restraint of trade."
21288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923).
12251 CONG. REC. 16273 (1914).
1-3National Biscuit Co. v. F. T. C., 299 Fed. 733 (C. A. A. 2d, 1924),
cert. denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924).
121J. A. McLAuGHLIN, Op. cit. 423, n. 119.
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the buyer and his competitors. The terms of the statute were perfectly
plain, said the court-there was no occasion for resort to Congressional
records: the statute applied if there was a substantial lessening of com-
petition in any line of commerce, and "any" included the line of com-
merce in which the buyer was engaged. 12 5
Reinstatement of the statute in this respect, however, was followed
by discovery of another point of vulnerability, culminating in the de-
cision in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. F. T. C."-"6 that price dif-
ferentials based on quantity, as allowed under the statute, need not
bear any reasonable relation to the cost of transportation or selling,
inasmuch as the statute contained another proviso, construed to be
exclusive, dealing with the latter factors. Support for this construction
was found in the fact that the amendment to Section 2 by the Robinson-
Patman Act (which was not applicable in this case) did require a con-
sideration of manufacturing, selling and delivery costs in fixing quantity
discounts. This decision does seem to represent a proper interpretation
of the statutory language on this point-apparently the case involved a
situation not anticipated by Congress.
Although the F. T. C. was unable to get a single order based on
Section 2 of the Clayton Act through the courts, 1'2 7 it did get judicial
approval of one order bearing upon price discrimination in an indirect
manner under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act. In Western Sugar Refining
Co. v. F. T. C."' the court upheld an order directing certain jobbers
to cease inducing manufacturers to discriminate in prices against a
wholesale company competing with the jobbers. While the court sus-
tained the Commission's determination that thfe jobbers' actions con-
stituted an unfair method of competition, Section 2 of the Clayton Act
was clearly inapplicable to them, since they were not the persons doing
the discriminating.
In 1936 Congress replaced Section 2 with the Robinson-Patman
Act,129 a statute designed to make some alterations in the judicial con-
struction of Section 2, and to expand the area of the Commission's
control over price-discriminating activities.
Subdivision (a) re-enacts Section 2 of the Clayton Act, in somewhat
different form. It forbids price discrimination between purchasers in
"'George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245
(1929), followed in American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d)
763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1930).
126101 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 557 (1940).
27An order based on Section 2 and directing termination of the notori-
ous Pittsburgh Plus system, In re U. S. Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924), was
never taken into court. Instead, "the Corporation inaugurated a more
complicated system of basing points which ameliorated without extinguish-
ing the most serious cause of complaint . J. A. McLAuGBmIN, op. cit.
288, n. 82.
128275 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
11949 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1939).
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sales in interstate or foreign commerce of commodities of like grade
and quality, where the effect of the discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce "or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any per-
son who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim-
ination, or with customers of either of them." Apparently the quoted
clause means that discrimination is forbidden if it injures, destroys or
prevents competition between: (1) the seller and his competitors, or
(2) the buyer and his competitors (the construction of Section 2 con-
tended for by the Commission)13 0 or (3) customers of the buyer and
their competitors. Clearly, the operation of the new statute was not
intended to be confined to cases of local price-cutting.
Subdivision (a) also expressly allows price differentials which "make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities" of sale or
delivery (thus rendering obsolete the law of the Goodyear case)' 3' and
subdivision (b) seems to allow a differential made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor. 132
While the Commission has entered several orders under these pro-
visions directing the termination of simple price discrimination,'"' and
of quantity discounts not based solely on manufacture, sales and de-
livery cost,3A and has found price discrimination in one case where
the manufacturer used different brands on differently priced articles,
and contended that the articles were not "of like grade and quality,"'1 35
'"This construction is given to the provision by the Commission. In
re Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F. T. C. 121 (1939); In re Williams & Wilkins
Co., 29 F. T. C. 678 (1939); In re American Optical Co., 28 F. T. C. 169(1939); In re Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 28 F. T. C. 186 (1939).
"1'But the F. T. C. is authorized, after investigation and hearing, to fix
quantity limits as to certain commodities where it finds that available
purchasers in greater quantities "are so few as to render differentials on
account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any
line of commerce." The Commission has never exercised this authority.
Attorney-General's Committee, op. cit. 65.
"'2The provision of the Clayton Act allowing bona fide selection of
customers is retained in subdivision (a), and it is also provided that
the amendment does not prevent price changes "in response to changing
conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods con-
cerned."
13In re American Oil Co., 29 F. T. C. 857 (1939); In re Williams &
Wilkins Co., 29 F. T. C. 678 (1939); In re Christmas Club, Inc., 25 F. T. C.
1116 (1937).
2'In re Simmins Co., 29 F. T. C. 727 (1939); In re Standard Brands,
Inc., 29 F. T. C. 121 (1939); In re Master Lock Co., 27 F. T. C. 982 (1938);
In re H. C. Brill Co., 26 F. T. C. 666 (1938). Several of these orders have
been specifically directed against basing point systems: In re Rowe Mfg.
Co., 27 F. T. C. 1376 (1938); In re Calcium Chloride Ass'n, 27 F. T. C.
1354 (1938).
"I n re U. S. Rubber Co., 28 F. T. C. 1489 (1939). See A. E. Sawyer,
The Commission's Administration of Paragraph 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act (1940), 8 GEo. WAsm L. REv.. 469, for a complete appraisal
of the Commission's work under this part of the Act.
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none of its orders in this field have been reviewed by the courts, so
that the extent to which the Robinson-Patman Act has changed the law
of price discrimination as it was under Section 2 of the Clayton Act
has not yet been judicially determined.
Subdivision (c) of the new Act makes it unlawful for any person,
in the course of interstate or foreign commerce, to pay or receive "any-
thing of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or
any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered
in connection with the sale or purchase of goods ... either to the other
party to such transaction or to an agent ... or other intermediary therein
where such intermediary is acting ...in behalf, or is subject to the
• . . control of any party to such transaction other than the person by
whom such compensation is so ... paid."
It is clear that the provision was aimed at price discrimination through
camouflaged rebates. But that is about all that is clear. The ambiguity,
of course, arises from the inclusion of the phrase "except for services
rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods."
In the five cases in which F. T. C. orders under the Robinson-Patman
Act have been subjected to judicial review, the Commission has been
sustained in its view that the "services rendered" clause does not set
up a condition upon which brokerage may be paid to buyers, their
agents or intermediaries. 36 These holdings have aroused a great amount
of speculation as to what effect the "services rendered" clause does
have. One suggestion is that it was inserted to make it clear that his
subdivision did not apply to a payment for true brokerage services
rendered by an independent broker in the professional sense of the
term, 1 7 but this de-emphasizing explanation has not satisfied the
writers.13 If the notion that the clause was inserted to satisfy the
demands of voluntary cooperative groups"I is correct, it means that
the provision was unavailing, for it was held in Quality Bakers of Amer-
ica v. F. T. C.1 40 that brokerage fees paid to a bakers' association
on account of purchases made by the association for its members
constituted a payment of the fees to the members in violation of
3
'Quality Bakers of America v. F. T. C., 114 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 1st,
1940); Webb-Crawford Co. v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 5th,
1940); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 667 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940), pet. rehear. denied, 309 U.
S. 694 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. F. T. C., 102 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939);
Biddle Purchasing Co. v. F. T. C., 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert.
denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938).
137Representative Utterback, 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (1936).
"See S. C. Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of
the Robinson-Patman Act (1940), 8 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 511, n. 12; Note
(1937) 6 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214; Note (1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. 114.
'
39Note (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 1303.
140114 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
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the Act.' 4 ' Another suggestion, 142 said to be favored by the F. T.
C., is that the exception is designed to permit brokerage payments
to intermediaries who actually render services to the seller and retain
the fees so earned, instead of passing them on to the buyer. While
there is a dictum in one of the cases to the effect that the provision
cannot be so construed,' 43 one case did base its determination that the
broker was not a "true intermediary," acting for both parties, on the
fact that it did not retain the brokerage payments, the implication
,being that if the payments had been retained, the statute would not
have been violated. 144 And in Oliver Bros. v. F. T. C.,'45 the court
assumed that subdivision (c) of the Act permitted dual representation,
but observed, on the facts before it, that "this is a very different thing
from the buyer receiving the compensation."'
1 46
This interpretation does seem the most reasonable of all those sug-
gested, if any meaning is to be given to the "services rendered" clause,
and it may well be that when the appropriate case is presented to the
courts, this construction will receive their more explicit blessing.
One other proposition has been clearly established by the decisions
construing subdivision (c), namely, that this subdivision is wholly in-
dependent of subdivision (a), so that there need be no proof of an
injurious effect upon competition, and that a cost justification on the
basis of manufacturing, selling or delivery expense is no. defense to
prosecution for unlawful brokerage allowance. And the Act, as so con-
strued, was held to be within Congress' commerce power, and not viola-
tive of the due process clause.1
47
Subdivisions (d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman amendment make
it unlawful for the seller to compensate a customer for services or
"'This case also illustrates a payment to the buyer in value other
than cash. The association here applied a part of the fees on membership
dues and operating expenses. However, the members received the balance
in the form of dividends on stock.
"2Note (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 607; Note (1937) 6 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
214.
1"'Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940), pet. rehear. denied, 309 U. S.
694 (1940).
"'Biddle Purchasing Co. v. F. T. C., 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938). The broker retained the payments in
Webb-Crawford Co. v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), but
there was no proof that it had rendered any service for the seller.
1'3102 F. (2d) 763, 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
'"6Cf. Quality Bakers of America v. F. T. C., 114 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A.
1st, 1940), wherein the court, said that, even if the agent did render
service to the seller, subdivision (a) was violated where the agent remitted
the brokerage payments to the buyer.
"4'Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940), pet. rehear, denied, 309 U. S.
694 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. F. T. C., 102 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939);
Biddle Purchasing Co. v. F. T. C., 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert.
denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938).
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facilities furnished by or through the customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale or offering for sale of products, or to provide
the services or facilities himself, unless such compensation is available
to "all other customers competing in the distribution of such products,"
or such services and facilities are available "to all purchasers", on
"proportionately equal terms."
One case decided by the F. T. C. under these provisions illustrates
the difficulties which will arise thereunder. In In re Golf Ball Mfr's
Ass'n,1 48 manufacturers of golf balls were compensating the Professional
Golfers' Association for the use of the insignia "P. G. A." on the man-
ufacturers' product. Part of the compensation was retained by the
Golfers' Association and part of it was passed on to its members, who
were retail sellers of golf balls. The Commission found all parties to
be guilty of a violation of subdivision (d) of the statute.
But if the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act is directed against
price discrimination, it would seem that this situation should not come
within the terms of the Act. The customer here had something unique
to provide-something which other customers could not provide. And,
it not being alleged or shown that the value of the insignia had no rea-
sonable relation to the compensation given, there is no apparent element
of price discrimination involved. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that
the F. T. C.'s order represents a correct literal application of the statute.
But, inasmuch as a contrary application seems possible here without
doing violence to statutory language, it may well be that when such a
case gets to the courts the statute will be so construed as not to forbid
this sort of transaction.
Tying Clauses
Section 3 of the Clayton Act 149 makes it unlawful to lease, sell or
contract for the sale of commodities, or to fix a price, rebate or discount
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser will not use or deal in the commodities of competitors of the
lessor or seller, where the effect of such arrangement may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. This section
was obviously designed to cover the practice of "full-line forcing,"
whereby the purchaser of a product agrees to use only the seller's line
of accessories or materials used or consumed in the use of the product
originally purchased (the most common concept of a "tying clause"),
and to include as well, general contracts to handle the products of the
seller exclusively.
Although the Second and Eighth Circuits upheld cease and desist
14826 F. T. C. 824 (1938). Other cases are pending. In re Bourgois, Inc.,
Docket 2972; In re Richard Hudnut, Docket 2973; In re Elmo, Inc., Docket
2974; In re Coty, Inc., Docket 2975; In re Curtin Bros., Docket 3381; In re
General Motors Corp., Docket 3866.14038 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1934).
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orders of the Commission in open and shut cases involving sales of
clothes patterns to 20,000 retailers under contracts not to handle pat-
terns of competitors'" and the giving of discounts to service stations
by a manufacturer of a famous automobile carburetor on the condition
that they carry no competing line,15' the Supreme Court gave the statute
a rather violent construction by holding that it was not violated where
a distributor leased gasoline tanks and pumps to service station oper-
ators on the condition that only the lessor's gasoline would be used
therein. That this agreement was directly within the terms of Section
3 seems uncontrovertible. That it had the effect of substantially lessen-
ing competition seems obvious, if consideration is given to the spatial
and economic limitations of many service station operators. Yet Mr.
Justice McReynolds observed that:
"Many competitors seek to sell excellent brands of gasoline
... . The lessee is free to buy wherever he chooses; he may
freely accept and use as many pumps as he wishes, and may
discontinue any or all of them. He may carry on his business
as his judgment dictates and his means permit, save only that
he cannot use the lessor's equipment for dispensing another's
brand. By investing a comparatively small sum ["The devices
are not expensive-$300 to 500 . . ."] he can buy an outfit
and use it without hindrance."'
1 52
From this premise it was concluded that there was no substantial
lessening of competition within the meaning of the Clayton Act. It is
perhaps a sufficient commentary on Justice McReynold's rationale to
point out that if there is no substantial lessening of competition because
the operator can buy another pump, there can be no violation of section
3 by full-line forcing contracts in any case except where the seller has
a monopoly of the principal product.
Thereafter the Seventh Circuit, apparently influenced by the attitude
of the Supreme Court, set aside a cease and desist order directed against
a manufacturer of 1 per cent of the oleomargarine and butter produced
in the United States, which sold its products to wholesalers on the
condition that they would not deal in the products of competitors.
There was no evidence, said the court, that the agreement "would, under
the circumstances disclosed, possibly lessen competition or create an
actual tendency to monopoly."' 5 3 While this same court later upheld
the Commission in forbidding a manufacturer of music rolls for player
150Butterick Co. v. F. T. C., 4 F. (2d) 010 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied,
267 U. S. 602 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
152Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F. T. C., 112 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 8th,
1940). The court was influenced by the fact that the manufacturer occu-
pied such a dominating position in the carburetor business that stations
had to have his brand in stock if they wanted to give any kind of car-
buretor service.
25
2F. T. C. v. Sinclair Reflning Co., 261 U. S. 463, 474 (1923).
151C. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F. T. C., 292 Fed. 720, 722 (C. C. A. 7th,
1923.)
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pianos from conditioning an exchange privilege on the dealer's agreement
not to handle the products of competitors, this later holding appears
to be based on the fact that this practice was a factor aiding in the
effectuation of an unlawful resale price maintenance policy.
54
After the Second Circuit had joined in the use of "substantial less-
ening of competition or tendency to monopoly" as a basis for deciding
that motion picture producers could refuse to lease films to exhibitors
except in blocks of several films,"' 5 the Commission virtually abandoned
attempts to enforce this section. While it has been suggested that Sec-
tion 3 be amended, as was Section 2, to outlaw tying clauses whenever
the effect thereof may be to injure competition between persons par-
ticipating in the practice and their competitors, rather than to require
a showing of substantial reduction of competition or tendency to monop-
oly,15G no such amendment has yet been proposed in Congress.
It would seem that the Commission should meet with more success
in the courts by condemning exclusive dealing contracts and full-line
forcing practices under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act, which statute
does not impose the stringent requirements of the Clayton Act for show-
ing a substantial lessening of competition or tendency toward monopoly.
Moreover, the Commission has more discretion under the F. T. C. Act
in defining an unfair method of competition than is possible under the
provisions of the Clayton Act outlawing the practices only when used
in making a lease or sale, or in fixing a price.' 57
But the record shows that orders based on Section 5 have met a
worse fate in the courts than those entered under the Clayton Act-not
a one has been sustained. The block-booking methods of the film pro-
ducers and the one-brand gasoline pump leases of the oil companies,
which were held not to violate the Clayton Act, were also held not to
constitute unfair methods of competition under the F. T. C. Act." s
The block-booking case was decided on the authority of a previous
decision of the Supreme Court in F. T. C. v. Gratz,"9 wherein the court
had said that a corporation selling cotton bagging did not violate Sec-
tion 5 by refusing to sell the bagging to purchasers who would not also
buy the ties necessary to be used with the bagging in baling cotton
unless the corporation had a monopoly.
In another case involving no clear statement of rationale, the Supreme
'71Q. R. S. Music Co. v. F. T. C., 12 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
'1:-F. T. C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1932).
'I'M. E. Rose, Enforcement of Section 3 of the Clayton Act (1940), 8 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 639.
'17In F. T. C. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923), an order of
the Commission based on Section 3 of the Clayton Act was set aside on
the ground that the contract was one of agency rather than of sale.
'IF. T. C. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1932); F. T. C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923).
'1253 U. S. 421 (1920).
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Court rejected the Commission's definition of unfair, methods of com-
petition as including a clause in a magazine publisher's contracts with
its distributing agents whereby they agreed not to handle other maga-
zines without its consent.
1 60
Insofar as the decisions under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act have
been based on an emphasis on monopoly, they have given'the Act
a narrower application than that given the Clayton Act, though there
seems to be no justification for such construction in the language of the
statute.
In any event, the result has been that the F. T. C. has not been able
effectively to use either Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of
the F. T. C. Act as a basis for terminating tying clause practices and
that little has been accomplished by the Commission in this field.1 6'
Stock Control
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 62 forbids the a'cquisition by one cor-
poration of stock of another corporation where the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition between the corpora-
tion whose stock is acquired and the corporation making the acquisition,
or to restrain commerce in any section or community, or to tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce. A similarly worded pro-
hibition is directed against a corporation acquiring stock in two or more
corporations where the effect of such acquisition or of the use of such
stock by voting or granting proxies or otherwise may be substantially
to lessen competition between the corporations whose stock is thus
acquired, or to restrain commerce.
The first case to reach the courts under this section presented a situa-
tion rendered rather complex by apparent efforts to evade the terms of'
the statute. The situation was this: X corporation and Y corporation,
competitors, organized Z corporation, with X holding one-third and Y
holding two-thirds of the stock in Z, and Y's assets were transferred to
Z. The court, in a very liberal interpretation of Section 7, sustained the
Commission's finding that the section had been violated, saying that
the effect of the transaction was to limit the potential competition be-
tween X corporation and Z corporation, though the acquisition took
place before, competition had actually begun. And even if the effect was
not to lessen competition, there was a tendency to create a monopoly.16 3
A different judicial temper was evident in the next case, wherein it
16 F. T. C. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923).
2l"Witness the statement of a former chairman of the Commission:
"The effect of the Gratz decision on the Commission was to paralyze its
activity .... It began a definite series of efforts to enforce the Clayton
Act .... [But it) crumbled at almost every touch and this effort was also
abandoned." N. B. GAsKILL, THE REGULATION OF Coi"PETmoN (1936), 71.
26238 STAT. 731 (1914); 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1934).
'"Aluminum Co. of America v. F. T. C., 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922), cert. denied, 261 U. S. 616 (1923).
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was decided by the Supreme Court that where stock had been acquired
in violation of Section 7, the Commission could order the violator so
to divest itself of the stock as not to secure the assets of the corporation
whose stock was acquired, but could not compel the divestiture of assets
acquired by use of the alleged stock control before the Commission's
complaint was filed..
6 4
This case initiated the principle of the race of diligence, but it re-
mained for the Arrow-Hart case' 65 to elevate that principle to its ulti-
mate heights. In this case the Commission had issued a complaint
against a holding company, charging it with holding all the voting stock
in two competing corporations. While this complaint was pending, the
holding company organized two dummy companies (for taxation pur-
poses) and transferred the stock of one of the competing operating
companies to each dummy corporation. In return, the stock of the
dummy corporations was, by direction of the holding company, issued
directly to its stockholders. Then, by merger of the two dummy cor-
porations and the two operating corporations, a new corporation was
formed, owning all the assets of the original operating companies. The
Commission filed a supplemental complaint against the new corporation
and, after proceedings thereunder, ordered it to divest itself of the
stock and the assets of one of the operating companies. The Supreme
Court set the order aside. Section 7, said Mr. Justice Roberts, does not
prevent merger of competing companies, and the fact that the merger
is effected by means of illegal stock control, after a complaint has been
filed, cahnot extend the Commission's jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Stone,
joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo,
dissented, pointing out that the illegal holding company device was the
first step in a scheme to eliminate competition, and contending that,
under the provisions of Section 11 of the Clayton Act, it should be
held that the Commission could undo a consummation of a transaction
which, at an earlier stage, it could have prevented.
The net effect of the Supremne Court's holdings, then, is that while
Section 7 gives the F. T. C. the power to forbid in advance the con-
version of illegally-acquired stock into tangible assets, if the conversion
is perfected before the Commission can comply with the procedural
requirements of the statute and get its order entered the Commission
has no power to set the conversion aside. 6'
'IF. T. C. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
0 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. F. T. C., 291 U. S. 587 (1934).
See discussion, p. 12, supra.
166A proposal has been made to amend Section 7 to cover acquisition
of assets. REP. ATr'Y GEN. (1926), 32. But this proposal has been criticized
as "an attempt to undo the Rule of Reason by making section 7 cover what
the Sherman Act was said to cover 30 years ago. Courts would then feel
the practical necessity of making a Rule of Reason out of the Clayton Act
and thus undoing it altogether." J. A. McLAuGmHm, Op. cit. 301, n. 94.
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To this questionable construction of Section 7, the Supreme Court
has added another: the word "substantial" in the phrase "to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition" is meant to qualify
the word "competition," so that there can be no violation of Section 7,
although a stock acquisition lessens actual competition between cor-
porations, if that actual competition, as seen by the ourt, is not sub-
stantial. 6 7 And the competition was held not to be substantial where
95 per cent of the products of two shoe companies went to the consumers
through different trade channels and where one of them was in such
bad financial condition that it could not have remained in business by
itself. The dissenters, Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis, apparently
accepted the majority's construction of the statute, but pointed out
that the fact that the companies sold through different trade channels
did not mean that they weren't competing for the same ultimate con-
sumer market, and maintained also that the Commission was justified
in deciding that the business of the financially embarrassed company,
conducted through a receiver or a reorganized company, would have
continued to compete with the other manufacturer.
The majority's interpretation of the statute would be a proper one
if its terms forbade only stock acquisition which injured competition
generally, but it is clearly a misinterpretation where the statute spe-
cifically protects competition between the corporations. There is no
occasion for an appraisal of the amount of that competition, if some
competition does in fact exist. But, in two cases decided since the,
Supreme Court case, the Circuit Courts have joined with the Supreme
Court in emasculating the "competition between corporations" provi-
sion. In Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. F. T. C.,168 the court found no
violation of Section 7 because the total output of the competing com-
panies was so small that if competition between them were lessened, its
effect on the whole interstate trade would not tend to create a monopoly.
This vi et armis identification of two tests which are specified disjunc-
tively in the statute gives the statute an even narrower application than
does the Supreme Court decision. V. Vivaudou, Inc., v. F. T. C.,69
introduced a third technique-i simply ignored the "competition be-
tween corporations" provision. Finding that the acquisition of stock
in a corporation doing a four million dollar cosmetics business by
a corporation doing a three million dollar business did not result
in a tendency to monoply or a restraint of commerce, where the total
annual cosmetics business in the United States was $125,000,000, the
court concluded that Section 7 was not violated.
As a result of all of this judicial mangling of statutory language,
'"
6 International Shoe Co. v. F. T. C., 280 U. S. 291 (1930).26851 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
26954 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act, like Section 3, has seldom been enforced
by the Commission. As of October, 1939, only thirteen cease and desist
orders had been entered in intercorporate stock acquisition proceedings.
Of the fifty-one discontinuances or dismissals of complaints after hear-
ings were completed,7 0 a large number may safely be assumed to have
been due to the unwillingness of the Commission to risk further re-
versals in court.
Interlocking Directorates
Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act,'17 it is unlawful for any person
to be at the same time a director in any two or more corporations, any
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating
more than $1,000,000, if such corporations are or were theretofore,
by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so
that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would
constitute a violation of the provisions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, or Sections 73-77 of the Wilson Tariff Act.
There has been practically no litigation under this section by the
Commission. Four cases thereunder have been discontinued or dis-
missed,172 and a provision in one consent decree entered in 1929 en-
forced the section against one director." 3 Otherwise, the interlocking
directorship provisions have not been invoked.
The reason for the non-enforcement of this section is probably not
alone that it would be most difficult for the Commission to prove that
a hypothetical agreement between the corporations involved would vio-
late the Sherman, Clayton or Wilson Acts, 1 4 but also that the section
has not been violated. The absence of violation may be explained, at
least in part, by the ease with which its purpose may be circumvented.
The terms of the statute may be strictly complied with and yet there
may be a common direction of nominally independent competitors,
achieved through a common ownership of stock. 5 The owner of the
stock has only to exercise his voting control through different trusted
representatives in order to secure complete cooperation in managerial
policies of the ostensible competitors.7 6 Ergo, it must be concluded that
Section 8 is practically ineffectualY.7 7
'
70G. H. Montague, The Commission's Jurisdiction over Practices in
Restraint of Trade. (1940), 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 365, 377.
17138 STAT. 732 (1914), amended as to provisions not material here, 39
STAT. 121 (1916), 41 STAT. 626 (1920), 45 STAT. 253 (1928); 45 STAT. 1536
(1929); 49 STAT. 718 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 19 (Supp., 1939).
17G. N. MONTAGUE, Op. cit. 375.
"7In re General Outdoor Advertising Co., Federal Anti-Trust Laws
(1931), 209.
"1'The section is criticized on this ground in G. C. HENDERSON, op. cit. 38.
"'5Section 7 applies only to stock holdings by corporations.
"""The few cases arising under this part of the statute are probably
due to the fact that its requirements can readily be met and the desired
results obtained by other means." F. T. C., ANNUAL REPORT (1927), 17.
"'It has been suggested that the section is not simply innocuous, but
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Conspiracy and Boycotting
The Commission has construed the "unfair methods of competition"
of Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act to apply to concerted action among
trade competitors to enforce the use of "regular" channels of trade, to
control prices, or to eliminate a competitor or a competing line of prod-
ucts.1 78 Probably in large part because the Sherman Act covers this
field, the Commission's interpretation has been upheld by the courts..7 9
In the first of these cases to reach the courts, an association of man-
ufacturers and retailers had adopted a policy whereby the manufacturers
refused to sell to persons doing a combined jobber-retailer business, and
the retailers refused to buy from manufacturers who sold to the jobber-
retailers. The F. T. C.'s order directing the termination of this general
trade boycott was affirmed. °0 Subsequently, the Commission was sus-
tained in its application of Section 5 to a boycott imposed by jobbers and
wholesalers upon manufacturers who sold their products at jobbers
terms and prices to a dealer doing both a wholesale and a retail business,
the court placing much emphasis upon the element of combination and
declaring that the action condemned violated the public policy ex-
pressed in the Sherman Act.18 ' Similarly, it has been held that Section
5 is violated when wholesalers and manufacturers conspire to prevent
sale by manufacturers directly to retailers or to cooperative purchasing
associations formed by retailers. 8 2
Where the conspiracy is between members of the trade, fixing a
horizontal price level at which all competing products will be sold, the
Commission's interpretation of Section 5 has not been seriously chal-
lenged, the contest in court being based upon alleged insufficiency of
of the evidence, or lack of jurisdiction over the conspirator. 8 3
harmful, in that, without affording any protection against monopolization
or control of the market, it deprives business of the direct counsel of the
most competent and best informed business leaders. M. N. WATKiNs, PUBLIC
REGULATION OF COAvTPETrnVE PRACTICE IN BusnrTEss ENTRPRSE (1940), 234.1781bid., 231.
x?9Cease and desist orders directed against an attempt to suppress com-
petition by boycott, Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. F. T. C., 22 F. (2d) 122
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927), and against a conspiracy to limit production, California
Rice Industry v. F. T. C., 102 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), have been
set aside on the ground that the practices condemned were not employed
in interstate commerce, hence were not within the Commission's jurisdic-
tion.
'BONational Harness MIrs. Ass'n v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A.
6th, 1920).
'
8 Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 277 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th,
1922).
'
8 2Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 533 (1927); Southern Hardware Jobbers'
Ass'n v. F. T. C., 290 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
1'3F. T. C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52 (1927);
California Rice Industry v. F. T. C., 102 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
Ten years after the order was affirmed in the Pacific States case, the asso-
ciation and several of its members were found in contempt of court for
violating it. F. T. C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n., 88 F. (2d) 1009
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Nor has the Commission encountered any difficulty in securing en-
forcement of orders directed against a conspiracy between jobbers and
manufacturers whereby the manufacturers refused to give the same
prices to a wholesale company as were given to the jobbers,8 4 a hori-
zontal combination to boycott a competitor,185 and threats by a retailers'
association to boycott manufacturers who sold to non-member retail-
ers."86 And in Butterick Publishing Co. v. F. T. C.,'8 7 it was held to be
an unfair method for publishers, acting jointly, to refuse to sell their
magazines to retailers who also sold second-hand magazines at cut prices.
It has been definitely established that a one-man boycott does not
violate Section 5, though imposed for the purpose of compelling a man-
ufacturer to cease selling to a competing wholesaler, 88 or enforcing a
resale price maintenance policy.' 8 9 Collusion is an essential element
to the establishment of an unfair method of competition in these cases.
Section 5 does not deprive the business man of his "vested" right to
refuse to deal with anyone for any reason sufficient to himself unless
that right is exercised in a manner contrary to the public policy declared
in the Sherman Act.
Resale Price Maintenance
At one time the Commission was quite active in prosecuting resale
maintenance schemes under Section 5. The Supreme Court had held
that it was an unfair method for a manufacturer to enforce such a
scheme by refusing to sell to price-cutting dealers until it had received
their assurance that they would thereafter maintain the price specified
by the manufacturer, and by employing an elaborate espionage system
involving lists of non-cooperative dealers, identifying marks on the
products sold, investigation and reporting by salesmen, and soliciting
of information on price-cutting from other dealers.' 90
Thereafter, the Circuit Courts occupied themselves in trying to deter-
mine how many of the above elements were determinative in the Su-
preme Court's decision. It was quite universally assumed that the
agreement of the chastened price cutter to maintain the fixed price as
a condition to further business with the manufacturer was an essential
element of the unfair method, though that agreement need not be
embodied in an enforceable contract.' 9' Conversely, there was unanimity
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
"
84Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. F. T. C., 275 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 9th,
1921).
185Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).8IF. T. C. v. Wallace, 75 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); California
Lumberman's Council v. F. T. C., 115 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
18785 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
188F. T. C. v. Raymond Bros., 263 U. S. 565 (1924).
'
80American Tobacco Co. v. F. T. C., 9 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925),
aff'd without review, 274 U. S. 543 (1927).
"I0F. T. C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922).
'
91Armant Co., Inc. v. F. T. C., 78 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935);
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in the determination that the lists of recalcitrant dealers and the identi-
fying symbols on the products were not essential. 92 But the unanimity
was broken when the Second and Sixth Circuits disagreed with the
Eighth as to the significance of the solicitation of cooperation from other
dealers in discovering price cutters. 19 3
Before this judicial speculation-which seems to have resolved itself
into a determination of the method as fair or unfair according to the
degree of its efficiency-could proceed further, Congress enacted the
Miller-Tydings Act,194 amending Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
expressly exempting from the provisions of the Sherman Act and of
Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act contracts fixing the minimum resale price
of any branded or trade-marked article which is "in free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class" where such
contracts are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions in the state
in which the resale is to be made. Since the privilege of stipulating the
resale price is not limited to the owner of the brand or trade mark,
jobbers and* wholesalers apparently may fix the resale figure. And
since forty-five states have now adopted "fair trade" laws, the scope
of the exemption is almost as wide as the interstate commerce jurisdiction
of the Commission. 95 There have been no proceedings against persons
using a resale price maintenance policy subsequent to the enactment
of this statute. 99
I Passing Off
Early cases sustained the Commission in its efforts under Section 5
to prevent the attempts of manufacturers and producers to simulate the
trade-marks and trade-names of well-known competitors, and thus to
trade on the competitor's reputation by passing off their products as
those of the competitor. Since the term "unfair competition" has its
Shakespeare Co. v. F. T. C., 50 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Harriet
Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. F. T. C., 15 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Cream of
Wheat Co. v. F. T. C., 14 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Q. R. S. Music
Co. v. F. T. C., 12 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Moir v. F. T. C., 12
F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v.
F. T. C., 11 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); American Tobacco Co. v.
F. T. C., 9 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Hills Bros. v. F. T. C., 9 F. (2d)
481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Oppenheim, Oberndorf & Co. v. F. T. C., 5 F. (2d)
574 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
19 2 Ibid.
""0Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. F. T. C., 15 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926); Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. F. T. C., 11 F. (2d) 337
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Cream of Wheat v. F. T. C., 14 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926).
"'150 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (Supp. 1939). For the Commission's
opposition to this Act, see its letter to President Roosevelt, reproduced in
G. H. MONTAGUE, Op. cit. 382.
"''But note that the Miller-Tydings Act does not withdraw the applica-
tion of section 5 to practices fixing maximum or absolute retail prices,
although some of the state acts allow this practice.
"Q6'I. N. WATnws, op. cit. 104.
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origin in the passing-off cases,197 the Circuit Courts encountered no
difficulty in finding that this was an unfair method of competition.' 9 8
But in F. T. C. v. Klesner 99 the Supreme Court held that proceedings
to terminate the use of a trade name in alleged violation of the rights of
the first user, where there was a dispute as to who had the right to use
of the name, were not in the interest of the public and that therefore
the complaint was improperly issued.
Although the decision in this case would seem to preclude any prosecu-
tion of "passing off" practices, the Commission has continued its cam-
paign against such methods. But its activity seems to have been limited
to the prosecution of cases wherein there is a deliberate stealing of
commercial good will, with no pretense of legal rights, 20 and this dis-
tinction may serve to avoid the rule of the Klesner decision when the
next case reaches the courts.
Disparagement
The Commission has determined that disparagement of a competitor
or his products is an unfair method. While its orders have been re-
versed on the ground of inadequacy of evidence,20 ' and lack of public
interest in the protection of misbranded articles,2 0 2 its interpretation of
Section 5 as including this practice has been sustained in cases involv-
ing express disparaging statements about a competitor's products-03 or
business methods, 20 4 and in a case where the respondent's false repre-
sentations as to the value received for its prices as compared to that
received for its competitors' prices were so stated as to induce the public
to believe that the competitors were unfair.
20 5
Vexatious Litigation
The F. T. C. has issued orders against vexatious litigation and threats
of litigation under Section 5. In two of the three cases that have come
before the courts, the Commission's order has been reversed for in-
adequacy of evidence to sustain the finding of vexatious threats; 20 6 in
the remaining case the order was sustained on a determination that
197M. Handler, Unfair Competition and The Federal Trade Commission
(1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 412; HARPER, TORTS (1933), 495.
'98Masland Duraleather Co. v. F. T. C., 34 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 3d,
1929); Lighthouse Rug Co. v. F. T. C., 35 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929);
F. T. C. v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Juvenile Shoe Co.
v. F. T. C., 289 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); cert. denied, 263 U. S. 705 (1923).
199280 U. S. 19 (1929).
2001n re Holmes, Inc. 23 F. T. C., 650 (1936); In re New England Col-
lapsible Tube Co., 22 F. T. C. 1 (1930); In re Roberts Tailoring Co., 14
F. T. C. 1 (1930); In re James Kelly, 13 F. T. C. 289 (1930).
-
0
'Philip Cary Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 29 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
2°"John Bene & Sons v. F. T. C., 299 Fed. 468 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
-03Perma-Maid Co. v. F. T. C., 121 F. (2d) 282 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
"''Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
"o5Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. F. T. C., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
2'Flynn & Emrich Co. v. F. T. C., 52 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931);
Heuser v. F. T. C., 4 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
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vexatious litigation was an unfair method.20 7 While the last case con-
stitutes judicial authority for the Commission's interpretation of the
statute, there is a dictum in one of the other cases208 to the effect that
there is no public interest in a proceeding to protect one competitor.
However, this dictum was based upon a rather indiscriminating concep-
tion of the doctrine of the Klesner case, so that the Commission may
yet be fully sustained in its action in this field.
Miscellaneous Practices
The Commission has been sustained in its holding that a false adver-
tisement to the effect that products of the respondent have been adopted
by the United States government is an unfair method of competition.
20 9
Similarly, an order directing the cessation of the use of testimonials
not given by the person whose name was used has been upheld. 210 But
the Second Circuit has reversed an order directing the respondent to
cease the use of admittedly truthful testimonials of famous people
without revealing that they were paid for writing them.
2 1
'
The Supreme Court has approved an order directing a large motion
picture film manufacturer-to cease coercing film development com-
panies, into contracting to buy all their film from it by threatening to
enter the film development field as a competitor. 212
Three orders have been entered forbidding the acquisition of trade
secrets by espionage or bribing of employees,213 none of which has been
reviewed by the courts. But in a case involving the securing of business
information, not appearing to be in the nature of a trade secret, by
sending employees of the respondent to pose as prospective customers
of a competitor, the order of the Commission was reversed on the ground
that there was no evidence that the information so acquired was used
in any unlawful manner so as to hinder or stifle competition.21 4
Inducing employees of competitors to breach their employment con-
tracts or merely to abandon non-contractual employment in such num-
bers or under such circumstances as to hinder the competitor has been
forbidden by F. T. C. orders,21 but the validity of such orders has
not been adjudicated.
-
07Chamber of Commerce v. F. T. C., 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).2
"
0Flynn & Emrich Co. v. F. T. C., 52 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
20
"Guaranty Veterinary Co. v. F. T. C., 285 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).210F. T. C. v. Standard Education Society, 86 F. (2d) 692 (C. C. A.
2d), 1936).
2
"Northam Warren Corp. v. F. T. C., 59 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).212F. T. C. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927), discussed p.
12, supra.2131n re U. S. Hoffman Machinery Corp., 5 F. T. C. 439 (1923); In re
Allen Sales Service, 1 F. T. C. 459 (1919); In re Standard Car Equipment
Co., 1 F. T. C. 144 (1918).2"2Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 29 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).2151n re Olson, 8 F. T. C. 449 (1925); In re Sunlight Creameries, 4
F. T. C. 55 (1921).
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The practice of buying up supplies for the purpose of causing a
shortage to competitors, a trade tactic similar to the old common law
offenses of forestalling, engrossing and regrating, but pursued for a
perhaps more censurable purpose, has been forbidden in two orders.2 16
While neither of these cases reached the courts, it does not seem im-
probable that the Commission would be sustained, providing that it can
convince the court that the practices of the respondent were pursued
for the purpose charged.
(To be continued)
2 161n re United Rendering Co., 3 F. T. C. 284 (1921); In re American
Agricultural Co., 1 F. T. C. 226 (1918).
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